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Abstract—The problem of designing a profit-maximizing,
Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mech-
anism with flexible consumers and costly heterogeneous supply
is considered. In our setup, each consumer is associated with a
flexibility set that describes the subset of goods the consumer is
equally interested in. Each consumer wants to consume one good
from its flexibility set. The flexibility set of a consumer and the
utility it gets from consuming a good from its flexibility set are
its private information. We adopt the flexibility model of [1] and
focus on the case of nested flexibility sets — each consumer’s
flexibility set can be one of k nested sets. Examples of settings
with this inherent nested structure are provided. On the supply
side, we assume that the seller has an initial stock of free supply
but it can purchase more goods for each of the nested sets at fixed
exogenous prices. We characterize the allocation and purchase
rules for a profit-maximizing, Bayesian incentive compatible and
individually rational mechanism as the solution to an integer
program. The optimal payment function is pinned down by the
optimal allocation rule in the form of an integral equation. We
show that the nestedness of flexibility sets can be exploited to
obtain a simple description of the optimal allocations, purchases
and payments in terms of thresholds that can be computed
through a straightforward iterative procedure.
Index Terms—Profit maximization, Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility, flexible demand, optimal auction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Allocation of limited resources among a set of self-
interested consumers whose preferences are their private infor-
mation, arises in a number of applications including cognitive
radio networks and communication networks. The allocation
procedure would typically involve eliciting some information
from the consumers. The self-interested consumers can be
strategic in revealing their private information. Hence, there
is a need to anticipate the consumers’ strategic behavior in
revelation of their private information. The economic theory
of mechanism design provides a framework for studying these
problems from a game theoretic perspective where the owner
of the resources can design the rules of interactions among the
consumers in a way that its desired objective emerges at the
equilibrium outcome of the induced game.
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing profit-
maximizing mechanisms for allocating multiple heterogeneous
goods to flexible consumers. We consider the flexibility model
proposed by [1] where for each consumer a flexibility set is
defined as the subset of goods the consumer finds equally
desirable. Each consumer wants to consume one good from
its flexibility set. A consumer’s flexibility set and the utility it
gets from consuming a good from its flexibility set are both
its private information. The flexibility sets considered in [1]
have a nested structure — each consumer’s flexibility set can
be one of the k sets, B1,B2, . . . ,Bk, which are nested in the
following way: B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Bk. (1)
A. Examples of Nested Flexibility
There are several markets where consumer flexibility resem-
bles the nested pattern in (1). An example comes from auction-
based spectrum allocation in cognitive radio networks ( [2],
[3]) where a primary spectrum owner has multiple frequency
bands with different bandwidths. These bands can be allocated
to secondary users who need a certain minimum amount of
bandwidth. Suppose the primary owner has frequency bands
of widths w1, w2, · · · , wk with w1 < w2 < · · · < wk.
Let Wi, i = 1, 2, · · · , k, denote the set of frequency bands
of width wi that are available for allocation to secondary
users. Define Bi =
k⋃
j=k−i+1
Wj , i = 1, 2, · · · , k, as the set of
frequency bands of width greater than or equal to wk−i+1. We
thus have B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Bk. A secondary user that needs
one frequency band of width at least wi can be interpreted as
having Bk−i+1 as its flexibility set.
Consider next auction-based content delivery in Wireless
Information Centric Networks [4] where multiple content
providers compete for limited cache storage resources pro-
vided by a Wireless Access Point (WAP) in a given region for
a certain time period. Suppose the WAP has k cache servers
with storage capacities c1 < c2 < . . . < ck. Assume that one
cache server can serve at most one content provider at a time.
Let Bi be the set of cache servers with capacity greater than or
equal to ck−i+1. Clearly the sets Bi, i = 1, . . . , k, are nested.
A content provider who needs a cache of storage capacity at
least ck−i+1 has the flexibility set Bi.
B. Comparison with Prior Literature
Numerous works have addressed social welfare maximizing
or efficient auctions, the most well-known of these being
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [5], [6], [7].
Efficient auctions have also been extensively studied in the
context of combinatorial auctions ( [8], [9, Chapter 8], [10,
Chapter 11]). Our focus in this paper, however, is on revenue-
maximizing auctions. In his seminal paper [11], Myerson
derived fundamental results for the single-unit revenue max-
imizing auction. In sequel, several works studied revenue-
maximizing multi-unit auctions with identical goods under
various assumptions about the consumers’ utility model and
private information structure. The setups in [12] and [13], for
instance, include the problem of auctioning multiple identi-
cal goods among consumers with unit demand and private
valuations. [14] considered the auction of multiple identical
goods to consumers with limited capacities for the number
of goods they can consume. Unlike these models where all
goods are perceived to be identical by all the consumers, in
our model consumers differentiate between goods according
to their flexibility sets.
The problem of designing revenue-maximizing auctions has
also been investigated in the context of combinatorial auctions
[15, Section 5.2] where the seller has multiple heterogeneous
items to auction and consumers can place bids on various
combinations/bundles of goods. Armstrong [16] and Avery et
al. [17] studied revenue-maximizing auction for the case where
the seller wants to sell two non-identical goods to several
consumers that can receive one or both of the goods. Unlike
these setups, in our model each consumer wants at most one
good and the number of goods can exceed two.
Some recent works ( [18], [19]) have studied the design of
revenue-maximizing auctions when the consumers are single-
minded. A single-minded consumer is interested in getting all
goods from a certain subset of goods. In contrast to these
models, in our setup each consumer wants to get one good
from its flexibility set.
[15, Section 5.2] considered a general setup where the
seller has multiple distinct goods and each consumer has
a value function that gives its valuation for each subset
of goods. For each allocation rule, [15] provides a linear
program whose solution (if it exists) gives a payment rule
that satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints. As mentioned in [15, Section 5.2], this approach
is computationally very demanding as the number of possible
allocation rules can be very large and no closed-form solutions
are available in general. Our model can be viewed as a special
case of the general framework of [15]. A consumer with
flexibility set Bi and valuation α can be viewed as having
a value function vi(S) = α if S ∩ Bi 6= ∅ and |S| = 1 and
0 otherwise. In sections IV-A-IV-D, we show that under the
assumption of nested flexibility sets, the optimal auction can
be found in a computationally much simpler fashion.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we discuss
the problem formulation and the mechanism setup in Section
II. In Section III, we characterize incentive compatibility
and individual rationality constraints for the mechanism. In
Section IV we characterize the allocation and purchase rules
for a profit-maximizing, Bayesian incentive compatible and
individually rational mechanism as the solution to an integer
program. Borrowing the results in [1], we simplify the optimal
allocations, purchases and payments and characterize them in
terms of simple thresholds. We conclude the paper in Section
V with a summary of our findings and point out potential
directions for further research.
D. Notations
{0, 1}N×M denotes the space of N × M dimensional
matrices with entries that are either 0 or 1. Z+ is the set of
non-negative integers. For a set A, |A| denotes the cardinality
of A. x+ is the positive part of the real number x, that is,
x+ = max(x, 0). Vector inequalities are component-wise; that
is, for two 1 × n dimensional vectors u = (u1, · · · , un) and
v = (v1, · · · , vn), u ≤ v implies that ui ≤ vi , for i =
1, · · · , n. 1{a≤b} denotes 1 if the inequality in the subscript is
true and 0 otherwise. E denotes the expectation operator. For
a random variable θ, Eθ denotes that the expectation is with
respect to the probability distribution of θ.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a setup where a seller has M goods and N
potential consumers. M = {1, 2, · · · ,M} denotes the set of
goods and N = {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the set of potential
consumers. Consumer i, i ∈ N , has a flexibility set φi ⊂M
which represents the set of goods the consumer is equally
interested in. Consumer i can consume at most one good from
its flexibility set φi. We assume that the flexibility set of each
consumer can be one of k nested sets. That is, we have k
nested subsets of the set of goods:
B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Bk ⊆M, (2)
and φi ∈ {B1,B2, · · · ,Bk} for every i ∈ N . We also define
B0 as the empty set, i.e., B0 = ∅. Based on their flexibility
sets, we can divide the consumers into k classes: Cl is the set
of consumers with flexibility set Bl. Clearly, N =
k⋃
i=1
Ci and
Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ , ∀i 6= j. We define
nl := |Cl| , ml := |Bl \ Bl−1|, l = 1, 2, . . . , k. (3)
We also define the vectors n and m as
n := (n1, n2, · · · , nk) , m := (m1,m2, · · · ,mk). (4)
The vector n is referred to as the demand profile and the vector
m is referred to as the supply profile.
If φi = Bj , we say that consumer i’s flexibility level,
denoted by bi, is j. Consumer i’s utility for receiving a good
from φi is θi. We assume that θi and bi are consumer i’s private
information and are unknown to other consumers as well as
the seller. We assume that (θi, bi), i ∈ N , are independent
random pairs taking values in the product set [θmaxi , θ
min
i ]×
{1, 2, · · · , k}1, i ∈ N . The probability distributions fi of
(θi, bi), i ∈ N , are assumed to be common knowledge. We
define θ := (θ1, θ2, · · · , θN ) and b := (b1, b2, · · · , bN) as
the consumers’ valuations profile and flexibility levels profile,
1θmin
i
is assumed to be non-negative for all i ∈ N .
respectively. f(θ, b) is the joint probability distribution of
(θ, b). Let Θi = [θ
min
i , θ
max
i ] and Θ :=
N∏
i=1
Θi. The pair
(θi, bi) is referred to as consumer i’s type.
While the initial set of goods (M) is available to the seller
at zero cost, it can purchase more goods for addition to the
sets Bi \ Bi−1, i = 1, · · · , k. Each additional good for the
sets Bi \ Bi−1, i = 1, · · · , k can be purchased at the price of
pi, i = 1, · · · , k, where p1 > p2 > · · · > pk.
A. Direct Mechanisms
We consider direct mechanisms where, for each i ∈ N ,
consumer i reports a valuation from the set Θi and a flexibility
level from the set {1, 2, · · · , k} to the seller. The consumers
can misreport their valuations as well as their flexibility levels.
We assume however that consumers cannot over-report their
flexibility levels:
Assumption 1. For each i ∈ N , consumer i’s reported
flexibility level ci cannot exceed its true flexibility level bi.
The above assumption can be justified by noting that con-
sumers gain no utility from getting a good outside their true
flexibility set and may in fact suffer a significant disutility if
allocated a good outside their true flexibility set. To avoid the
risk of getting an unusable or damaging good, consumers may
reasonably restrict themselves to under-reporting or truthfully
reporting their flexibility levels.
A mechanism consists of an allocation rule ξ, a payment
rule t and a purchase decision rule g. The allocation rule ξ is
a function from the type profile space Θ× {1, 2, · · · , k}N to
{0, 1}N with its ith entry ξi being equal to 1 if consumer i
receives a good and 0 otherwise. We assume that the allocation
rule ξ does not give a consumer any good that is outside its
reported flexibility set. This can be formalized as follows:
Assumption 2. We assume that for each i ∈ N , if consumer
i reports flexibility level ci, the mechanism either allocates a
good from Bci to consumer i or it does not allocate any good
to consumer i.
The above assumption simply means that the mechanism
respects the consumer’s reported flexibility constraint.
The purchase decision rule g is a function from Θ ×
{1, 2, · · · , k}N to Zk+ with its ith entry gi being the number
of goods additionally purchased at the price of pi and added
to the set Bi \ Bi−1.
We require that each of the (M available and the addition-
ally purchased) goods be allocated to at most one consumer
and that each consumer receives at most one good. The
allocation and purchase decision vector pairs (ξ, g) that satisfy
these two constraints together, are called feasible decision
vector pairs. The feasibility constraints are formally stated in
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For a reported type profile (r, c) ∈ Θ ×
{1, 2, · · · , k}N , the allocation ξ(r, c) and purchase g(r, c) will
satisfy the feasibility constraints if and only if∑
l:cl≤i
ξl(r, c) ≤
∑
j≤i
(mj + gj(r, c)) , i = 1, 2, · · · , k. (5)
Proof. The proof is based on the arguments in [1, Section
V-A].
We define S(c) ⊂ {0, 1}N×Zk+ as the set of all ξ(r, c) and
g(r, c) that satisfy (5). That is,
S(c) :=
{(
x ∈ {0, 1}N ,y ∈ Zk+
)
:∑
l:cl≤i
xl ≤
∑
j≤i
(mj + yj) , i = 1, 2, · · · , k
}
.
(6)
The payment rule is a mapping from Θ × {1, 2, · · · , k}N
to RN with the ith component ti being the payment charged
to consumer i.
Consider a mechanism (ξ, g, t) and suppose consumers
report valuations r := (r1, r2, · · · , rN ) and flexibility levels
c := (c1, c2, · · · , cN )2. The mechanism then results in an
allocation vector ξ(r, c), purchase decision vector g(r, c) and
payments t(r, c). Consumer i’s utility function can then be
written in terms of its true valuation θi, true flexibility level
bi, the reported valuations r and the reported flexibility levels
c as
ui(θi, r, bi, c) = θiξi(r, c)− ti(r, c). (7)
The seller’s objective is to find a mechanism that maximizes
its expected profit while satisfying Bayesian Incentive Com-
patibility and Individual Rationality constraints. We describe
these constraints below.
In a Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism, truth-
ful reporting of private information (valuations and flexibil-
ity levels in our setup) constitutes an equilibrium of the
Bayesian game induced by the mechanism. In other words,
each consumer would prefer to report its true valuation and
flexibility level provided that all other consumers have adopted
truth-telling strategy. Bayesian incentive compatibility can be
described by the following constraint:
Eθ−i,b−i
[
θiξi(θ, b)− ti(θ, b)
]
≥
Eθ−i,b−i
[
θiξi(ri, θ−i, ci, b−i)− ti(ri, θ−i, ci, b−i)
]
,
∀θi, ri ∈ Θi , ci ≤ bi, ci, bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(8)
(8) states that if consumer i with type (θi, bi) reports some
other type (ri, ci), its expected utility will be no better than
the expected utility it gets if it reports its type truthfully. Note
that Assumption 1 implies that the BIC constraint in (8) need
not consider the case of ci > bi.
Individual Rationality (IR) constraint implies that the con-
sumer’s expected utility at the truthful reporting equilibrium
is non-negative. This can be expressed as:
Eθ−i,b−i
[
θiξi(θ, b)− ti(θ, b)
]
≥ 0 ,
∀θi ∈ Θi , bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(9)
2consumers may not report their valuations and/or flexibility levels truth-
fully, so ri and ci may be different from θi and bi, respectively.
The expected profit under a BIC and IR mechanism is
Eθ,b
{ N∑
i=1
ti(θ, b)−
k∑
j=1
pjgj(θ, b)
}
when all consumers adopt
the truthful strategy.
The mechanism design problem can now be formulated as
max
(ξ,g,t)
Eθ,b
{ N∑
i=1
ti(θ, b)−
k∑
j=1
pjgj(θ, b)
}
,
subject to (ξ(θ, b), g(θ, b)) ∈ S(b), ∀(θ, b) ∈ Θ × {1, 2, · · · , k}N ,
(8), (9). (10)
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF BIC AND IR MECHANISMS
Suppose all consumers other than i report their valuations
and flexibility levels truthfully. We can then define consumer
i’s expected allocation and payment under the mechanism
(ξ, g, t) when it reports ri ∈ Θi , ci ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} as:
Ξi(ri, ci) := Eθ−i,b−i
[
ξi(ri, θ−i, ci, b−i)
]
, (11)
Ti(ri, ci) := Eθ−i,b−i
[
ti(ri, θ−i, ci, b−i)
]
. (12)
We can now rewrite equations (8) and (9) in terms of the
interim quantities defined in (11)-(12). The BIC constraint for
misreports of valuations and flexibility levels becomes:
θiΞi(θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) ≥ θiΞi(ri, ci)− Ti(ri, ci) ,
∀θi, ri ∈ Θi , ci ≤ bi , ci, bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(13)
The IR constraint is rewritten as:
θiΞi(θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) ≥ 0 ,
∀θi ∈ Θi , bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(14)
The BIC constraint in (13) captures all possible ways that a
consumer may misreport its private information. It includes
the following two special sub-classes of constraints:
1) BIC constraint for misreporting only valuation:
θiΞi(θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) ≥ θiΞi(ri, bi)− Ti(ri, bi) ,
∀θi, ri ∈ Θi , ∀bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N . (15)
2) BIC constraint for misreporting only flexibility level:
θiΞi(θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) ≥ θiΞi(θi, ci)− Ti(θi, ci) ,
∀θi ∈ Θi , ci ≤ bi , ci, bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(16)
The following result relates the above constraints for “one-
dimensional” misreports to the general BIC constraint in (13).
Lemma 2. The BIC constraint for misreporting both valu-
ation and flexibility level implies and is implied by the BIC
constraints for misreporting only valuation and misreporting
only flexibility level. That is, (13) holds if and only if (15) and
(16) hold.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for Lemma 1 in [1].
Lemma 2 allows us to replace the general BIC constraint for
two-dimensional misreports by the simpler one-dimensional
BIC constraints given in (15) and (16). The mechanism design
problem now becomes:
max
(ξ,g,t)
Eθ,b
{ N∑
i=1
ti(θ, b)−
k∑
j=1
pjgj(θ, b)
}
,
subject to (ξ(θ, b), g(θ, b)) ∈ S(b),
∀(θ, b) ∈ Θ× {1, 2, · · · , k}N , (14), (15), (16).
We will now derive alternative characterizations of the
constraints (14), (15), (16) that will be helpful for finding the
optimal mechanism.
Lemma 3. A mechanism (ξ, g, t) satisfies the BIC constraint
for misreporting only valuation (as given in (15)) if and only
if for all i ∈ N , Ξi(ri, bi) is non-decreasing in ri and
Ti(ri, bi) = Ki(bi) + riΞi(ri, bi)−
ri∫
θmin
i
Ξi(s, bi) ds, ∀bi. (17)
Proof. The proof is similar to the arguments in chapters 2-3 of
[20] as well as the proof for Lemma 2 in [1] for characterizing
BIC mechanisms.
Lemma 4. Suppose the mechanism (ξ, g, t) satisfies the BIC
constraint for misreporting only valuation (as given in (15)).
Then, it satisfies the IR constraint (14) if and only if
θmini Ξi(θ
min
i , bi)− Ti(θ
min
i , bi) ≥ 0. (18)
Proof. Clearly (14) implies (18). The converse follows from
Lemma 3 by noting that
Ki(bi) = Ti(θ
min
i , bi)− θ
min
i Ξi(θ
min
i , bi),
and that the right hand side above is non-positive due to (18).
Using the above two lemmas, we derive a sufficient con-
dition for the mechanism to satisfy the BIC constraint for
misreporting only flexibility level.
Lemma 5. Suppose the mechanism (ξ, g, t) is individually
rational and satisfies the BIC constraint for misreporting only
valuation (as given in (15)). Then the mechanism (ξ, g, t)
satisfies the BIC constraint for misreporting only flexibility
level if the following are true:
(i) Ξi(θi, ci) is non-decreasing in ci , ∀θi ∈ Θi, ∀i ∈ N ,
and
(ii) Ti(θ
min
i , ci) = 0 , ∀ci ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for Lemma 4 in [1].
IV. PROFIT MAXIMIZING MECHANISM
We can now use the results of Section III to simplify the
objective of the mechanism design problem. We define
wi(θi, bi) :=
(
θi −
1− Fi(θi|bi)
fi(θi|bi)
)
, (19)
where fi(θi|bi) is the conditional probability density function
of consumer i’s valuation conditioned on its flexibility level
bi and Fi(θi|bi) is the corresponding cumulative distribution
function. wi(θi, bi) is referred to as consumer i’s virtual type
or virtual valuation in economics terminology [20].
For a mechanism that is individually rational and Bayesian
incentive compatible, we can use the result in Lemma 3 to plug
in the expression for Ti(θi, bi). After some simplifications we
obtain
Eθ,b
{ N∑
i=1
ti(θ, b)−
k∑
j=1
pjgj(θ, b)
}
(20)
= Ebi
[
Ki(bi)
]
+
∑
b
∫
θ
[
ξi(θ, b)wi(θi, bi)−
k∑
j=1
pjgj(θ, b)
]
f(θ, b)dθ.
The second term on the right hand side in 20 is completely
determined by the choices of the allocation ξ(·, ·) and purchase
g(·, ·) functions. Also, note that Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that
Ki(bi) = Ti(θ
min
i , bi) − θ
min
i Ξi(θ
min
i , bi) ≤ 0. Therefore, a
mechanism (ξ, g, t) that maximizes the second term on the
right hand side in 20 and ensures that Ki(bi) = 0 for all i and
bi while satisfying the BIC and IR constraints would provide
the largest expected profit.
In order to simplify maximization of the second term in 20
we assume that the virtual types
(
θi −
1−Fi(θi|bi)
fi(θi|bi)
)
are non-
decreasing in θi and bi. Such a condition holds if
fi(θi|bi)
1−Fi(θi|bi)
is non-decreasing in θi and bi. This condition can be viewed
as a generalization of the increasing hazard rate condition [20,
Chapter 2] and is similar to the condition about monotonicity
of virtual valuations described in [21] for multidimensional
private types. We formally state this condition and our as-
sumptions below.
Generalized Monotone Hazard Rate Condition: The type
(θi, bi) is said to be partially ordered above (θ
′
i, b
′
i), and this
relation denoted by (θi, bi)  (θ′i, b
′
i), if θi ≥ θ
′
i and bi ≥ b
′
i.
The distribution fi(·, ·) then satisfies the generalized monotone
hazard rate condition if:
(θi, bi)  (θ
′
i, b
′
i) =⇒
fi(θi|bi)
1− Fi(θi|bi)
≥
fi′(θ
′
i|b
′
i)
1− Fi′(θ′i|b
′
i)
; (21)
Further, bi > b
′
i and θi ≥ θ
′
i imply
fi(θi|bi)
1− Fi(θi|bi)
>
fi′(θ
′
i|b
′
i)
1− Fi′(θ′i|b
′
i)
. (22)
Assumption 3. We assume that the probability density func-
tions fi(·, ·) satisfy the generalized monotone hazard rate
condition for all i ∈ N .
Assumption 4. We assume that wi(θ
min
i , bi) < 0 , ∀bi ∈
{1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
The following theorem characterizes the optimal mechanism
under the above assumptions.
Theorem 1. Consider the allocation, purchase and tax func-
tions (ξ∗, g∗, t∗) defined below
(ξ∗(θ, b), g∗(θ, b)) ∈ argmax
(a,d)∈S(b)
{ N∑
i=1
aiwi(θi, bi)−
k∑
j=1
pjdj
}
,
(23)
where ai and dj are the ith and jth entries of the vectors a
and d respectively;
t∗i (θ, b) := θi ξ
∗
i (θ, b)−
θi∫
θmin
i
ξ∗i (s, θ−i, b) ds. (24)
Then, under Assumptions 1-4, (ξ∗, g∗, t∗) is a profit-
maximizing Bayesian incentive compatible and individually
rational mechanism.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for Theorem 1 in
[1].
The optimal allocation and purchase vectors pair
(ξ∗(θ, b), g∗(θ, b)) given in (23) is the solution of an
integer program and hence computationally hard to obtain.
Moreover, each type profile (θ, b) ∈ Θ × {1, 2, · · · , k}N
requires the solution of a different integer program. Similarly,
the characterization of payments given by (24) is not very
useful from a computational viewpoint as it requires the
solution of a continuum of integer programs.
Navabi et al. [1] considered the same mechanism with fixed
supply (gj = 0, j = 1, · · · , k) and showed that by leveraging
the nested structure imposed on the consumers’ flexibility sets
(see (2)) the optimal allocation as characterized in Theorem
1 can be simplified. We summarize their main results in the
following subsection.
A. Optimal Allocation for the Case with Fixed Supply
In the mechanism (ξ, g, t), suppose gj(θ, b) = 0, j =
1, 2, · · · , k for all (θ, b) ∈ Θ × {1, 2, · · · , k}N , that is, the
seller’s available supply is fixed and no further purchases will
be made. Then, based on the results in [1] under the optimal al-
location, consumer l in class Ci gets a desired good if its virtual
valuation exceeds 0 and the thresholds wthri , w
thr
i+1, · · · , w
thr
k
where, the thresholds {wthri }
k
i=1 are obtained using an iterative
algorithm constructed in [1]. Consider the non-negative integer
quantities r∗1 , · · · , r
∗
k that are obtained as the solutions to k
one-dimensional integer programs that are solved recursively
(see Lemma 6 in [1]). The above thresholds are then con-
structed in terms of r∗1 , · · · , r
∗
k through an iterative algorithm
that we briefly outline here (for a complete description of this
procedure see [1, section V-B]):
1) Firstly, any consumer l with wl(θl, bl) ≤ 0 is immediately
removed from consideration and is not allocated any
good. For each class of consumers, define the subset of
consumers who have positive virtual valuations: C+i :=
{l ∈ Ci : wl(θl, bl) > 0}. Define r∗1 , . . . , r
∗
k as in Lemma
6 of [1] accordingly.
2) Let L1 := C
+
1 . From L1, r
∗
1 consumers with the lowest
virtual valuations are removed from consideration3. The
set of remaining consumers in L1 is denoted by N1.
3Ties are resolved randomly. For continuous valuations, ties happen with
zero probability and therefore the allocation rule for ties does not affect
expected profit.
3) We now proceed iteratively: For 2 ≤ i ≤ k, given
the set Ni−1, define Li := Ni−1
⋃
C+i . Remove r
∗
i
consumers with lowest virtual valuations from Li. The
set of remaining consumers in Li is now defined as Ni.
4) After the kth iteration, all consumers in Nk are allocated
a good from their respective flexibility sets.
The thresholds {wthri }
k
i=1 are then defined as
wthri := (r
∗
i )
th lowest virtual valuation in Li, i = 1, 2, · · · , k.
(25)
(If r∗i = 0, w
thr
i = 0.)
Hence, under the optimal allocation, consumer l in class Ci
gets a desired good if its virtual valuation exceeds 0 and the
thresholds wthri , w
thr
i+1, · · · , w
thr
k .
B. Optimal Purchase Decisions
For each type profile (θ, b) ∈ Θ × {1, 2, · · · , k}N , let Ai
denote the set of consumers in class Ci who are served under
the supply profile (m1,m2, · · · ,mk) through the allocation
procedure outlined in Section IV-A, that is, for i = 1, 2, · · · , k
Ai :=
{
l ∈ Ci : wl(θl, i) > max{0, w
thr
i , w
thr
i+1, · · · , w
thr
k }
}
,
(26)
where, the thresholds {wthri }
k
i=1 are given in (25). Define A =
k⋃
i=1
Ai. Considering the results pointed in Section IV-A, A is
thus the set of all consumers who were served under the supply
profile (m1,m2, · · · ,mk).
The optimal purchase decisions are now characterized in the
following lemma.
Lemma 6. For each type profile (θ, b) ∈ Θ× {1, 2, · · · , k}N
define
Ei := {j ∈ Ci \ Ai : wj(θj , i) > pi} , i = 1, 2, · · · , k. (27)
Then, the optimal purchase decisions are
g∗i (θ, b) = |Ei| , i = 1, 2, · · · , k. (28)
Proof. See Appendix VI.
C. Optimal Allocation
With the optimal purchase decisions g∗ := (g∗1 , g
∗
2 , · · · , g
∗
k)
characterized in (28), the increased supply profile is mg
∗
:=
(m1+g
∗
1 ,m2+g
∗
2 , · · · ,mk+g
∗
k). The problem is now similar
to one with the fixed supply mg
∗
as formulated and solved
in [1]; hence, given the new supply profile mg
∗
and using
the results in Section IV-A and Lemma 6, it can be shown
that under the optimal allocation, consumer l in class Ci gets
a desired good if its virtual valuation exceeds 0 and the
thresholds wthri , w
thr
i+1, · · · , w
thr
k , or the unit price pi. Let us
define
θ
g∗
l,i :=
{
x : wl(x, i) = min
{
pi,max{0, {w
thr
j }
k
j=i}
}}
,
l ∈ Ci, i = 1, 2, · · · , k. (29)
Because of the monotonicity of virtual valuation as a function
of true valuation, consumer l in class Ci gets a good if θl >
θ
g∗
l,i . Thus,
ξ∗l (θ, b) =
{
1 if θl > θ
g∗
l,i
0 otherwise
, ∀l ∈ Ci, i = 1, 2, · · · , k.
(30)
D. Payment Functions
We can now use the optimal allocation rule described in
section IV-C to simplify consumers’ payment functions. From
(24) the optimal payment function for consumer l in flexibility
class Ci has the following form:
t∗l (θ, b) = θlξ
∗
l (θ, b)−
θl∫
θmin
l
ξ∗l (s, θ−l, b) ds. (31)
Using the definition of ξ∗l (θ, b) given in (30), t
∗
l (θ, b) can be
simplified as:
1) If θl > θ
g∗
l,i ,
t∗l (θ, b) = θl −
θ
g∗
l,i∫
θmin
l
ξ∗l (s, θ−l, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
ds−
θl∫
θ
g∗
l,i
ξ∗l (s, θ−l, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
ds = θg
∗
l,i .
(32)
2) If θl ≤ θ
g∗
l,i , t
∗
l (θ, b) = 0.
The optimal allocation and purchase decisions as well as
the optimal payments can thus be computed through the
straightforward threshold-based procedure outlined in section
IV-A. By using the nested structure of flexibility sets, this
procedure obviates the need to solve the computationally hard
integer program formulated in Theorem 1.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of designing profit-maximizing
mechanisms for allocating multiple goods to flexible con-
sumers. We characterized the allocation and purchase rules
for an incentive compatible, individually rational and profit-
maximizing mechanism as the solution to an integer program.
The payment function was determined by the optimal alloca-
tion rule in the form of an integral equation. We then exploited
the nested structure imposed on the flexibility sets to simplify
the optimal mechanism and provided a complete characteriza-
tion of allocations, purchase decisions and payments in terms
of simple thresholds.
An interesting direction for further exploration is to study
this mechanism problem in a dynamic framework where the
population of the consumers that interact with the market as
well as seller’s supply undergo stochastic changes over time.
Richer information structures may be needed to address those
cases.
VI. PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2
Consider the supply vector (m1 + h1, · · · ,mk +
hk), h1, · · · , hk ≥ 0. We want to show that
(g∗1 , · · · , g
∗
k) is the optimal purchase decision vector
where, g∗i = |Ei|, i = 1, 2, · · · , k (see (27)). Let
Ai(h1, h2, · · · , hk), i = 1, · · · , k denote the set of
consumers in class Ci who are served under the supply
profile (m1 + h1, · · · ,mk + hk), h1, · · · , hk ≥ 0. Recall that
Ai, i = 1, 2, · · · , k denotes the set of consumers in class Ci
that are served under the supply profile (m1,m2, · · · ,mk)
(see (26)) using the allocation procedure outlined in section
IV-A.
We start from flexibility level k and we consider the
following two cases:
(1.1) Ak(h1, h2, · · · , hk−1, 0) ⊃ Ak,
(1.2) Ak(h1, h2, · · · , hk−1, 0) = Ak.
Case (1.1) implies that there exists some consumer in class
Ck who is served with an additionally purchased good
for some set Bi ⊂ Bk at the price of pi. In this case
(h1, h2, · · · , hk−1, hk) cannot be optimal for any hk ≥ 0;
essentially because one can reduce hi by 1 and increase
hk by 1 to improve the objective function value in (23) by
the amount (pi − pk). Hence, we consider purchase decision
vectors (h1, h2, · · · , hk) , h1, · · · , hk ≥ 0 such that case (1.2)
is true.
Assumption 2 implies that the hk purchased goods for Bk \
Bk−1 can only be used to serve the consumers in class Ck.
From case (1.2) it follows that |Ak(h1, · · · , hk−1, hk)| cannot
exceed |Ak|+ hk. Now consider the following two cases
(2.1) |Ak(h1, · · · , hk−1, hk)| <
|Ak(h1, h2, · · · , hk−1, 0)|+ hk,
(2.2) |Ak(h1, · · · , hk−1, hk)| =
|Ak(h1, h2, · · · , hk−1, 0)|+ hk.
Case (2.1) implies that at least one of the hk goods is not
being allocated to any consumer in Ck and hence, is wasted.
In this case also (h1, · · · , hk−1, hk) cannot be optimal for any
hk > 0 since hk can be reduced by 1 to eliminate the incurred
cost of the wasted good (pk) and improve the value of the
objective function; hence, we consider vectors (h1, · · · , hk)
that satisfy case (2.2) where all the purchased hk goods are
allocated to the consumers in Ck and thus, are not wasted.
Suppose now we start from hk = 0 and increase it; as a
result, the positive terms (wj−pk), j ∈ Ek (see (27)) are added
in the objective function (see (23)) that increase its value. We
continue to increase hk until hk = |Ek| = g∗k; if we increase hk
further such that hk > g
∗
k, it follows from case (2.2) — all the
hk goods must be allocated — that the objective function value
begins to decline; essentially because the terms (wj−pk), j ∈
Ck \ (Ek ∪ Ak) that are added then, are not positive since
wj < pk , j ∈ Ck \ (Ek ∪ Ak); hence, hk = |Ek| = g∗k is the
optimal number of goods to purchase at the price of pk and
add to Bk \ Bk−1.
The above arguments imply that in order for the purchase
decision vector (h1, · · · , hk) to be optimal, it needs to satisfy
the following:
1) Case (1.2) holds true,
2) Case (2.2) holds true,
3) hk = |Ek| = g∗k.
Hence we restrict our attention to the decision vectors
(h1, · · · , hk) that satisfy the above three conditions.
Inductive step:
Induction hypothesis: suppose now that the optimal purchase
vector has the form (h1, · · · , hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) where the (i+
1)th up until kth entries are fixed as: g∗j = |Ej |, j = i +
1, · · · , k.
We now want to show that in order for the decision vector
(h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g
∗
i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) to be optimal, it must be that
hi = |Ei| = g∗i .
Consider the following cases
(3.1) For some j ∈ {i+ 1, · · · , k} :
Aj(h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) ⊃
Aj(h1, · · · , hi−1, 0, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k),
(3.2) Aj(h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) =
Aj(h1, · · · , hi−1, 0, g
∗
i+1, · · · , g
∗
k), for all
j = i + 1, · · · , k.
Case (3.1) implies that there is some consumer in some class
Cj , i+1 ≤ j ≤ k that is served with an additionally purchased
good from the set Bi \ Bi−1 at the price of pi; clearly, in
this case (h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) cannot be optimal
for any hi > 0; simply because hi can be reduced by 1 while
hj = g
∗
j is increased to hj = g
∗
j + 1 to enhance the objective
function value in (23) by the amount (pi − pj). Therefore,
we consider decision vectors (h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k)
such that case (3.2) holds true, that is, none of the consumers
in classes Cj, j = i + 1, · · · , k are served with the purchased
hi goods from the set Bi \ Bi−1.
Now consider the following two cases:
(4.1) Ai(h1, · · · , hi−1, 0, g
∗
i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) ⊃ Ai,
(4.2) Ai(h1, · · · , hi−1, 0, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) = Ai.
Case (4.1) implies that some consumer in class Ci is served
with an additionally purchased good from some set Bl \
Bl−1, l < i; in this case also (h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g
∗
i+1, · · · , g
∗
k)
cannot be optimal for any hi ≥ 0; essentially because one can
reduce hl by 1 and increase hi by 1 to improve the objective
function value by (pl− pi). Case (4.2) however indicates that
none of the consumers in Ci are served with additionally
purchased goods from the sets Bl \ Bl−1, l < i. We thus
consider the decision vectors (h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k)
such that cases (3.2) and (4.2) both hold true.
Assumption 2 and case (3.2) imply that the addition-
ally purchased hi goods can only be used to serve the
consumers in Ci. Also, from case (4.2) it follows that
|Ai(h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g
∗
i+1, · · · , g
∗
k)| cannot exceed |Ai|+ hi.
Now consider the following two cases
(5.1) |Ai(h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k)| <
|Ai(h1, · · · , hi−1, 0, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k)|+ hi,
(5.2) |Ai(h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g
∗
i+1, · · · , g
∗
k)| =
|Ai(h1, · · · , hi−1, 0, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k)|+ hi.
Case (5.1) implies that there is at least one of the
hi goods that is not allocated to any consumer in Ci
and hence, is wasted; it thus follows that in this case
(h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) cannot be optimal for any
hi > 0 simply because one can reduce hi by 1 to eliminate
the incurred cost of the wasted good and increase the value
of the objective function by pi. On the other hand, case
(5.2) implies that all the hi purchased goods are allocated
to the consumers in Ci; thus, we consider decision vectors
(h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) that satisfy the cases (3.2),
(4.2) and (5.2). Given this, suppose we start from hi = 0 and
increase its value; as a result, the positive terms (wj−pi), j ∈
Ei are added in the objective function and its values increases.
We continue to increase hi until hi = |Ei| = g
∗
i ; if we increase
hi further such that hi > g
∗
i , it follows from case (5.2) that
the terms (wj − pi), j ∈ Ci \ (Ei ∪ Ai) that are added then,
are not positive because wj < pi , j ∈ Ci \ (Ei ∪ Ai); hence,
hi = |Ei| = g∗i is the optimal number of goods to purchase at
the price of pi and add to Bi \ Bi−1.
From the above arguments it is deduced that in order for the
decision vector (h1, · · · , hi−1, hi, g∗i+1, · · · , g
∗
k) to be optimal,
it needs to satisfy the following:
1) Case (3.2) holds true,
2) Case (4.2) holds true,
3) Case (5.2) holds true,
4) hi = |Ei| = g∗i .
Therefore, we conclude inductively that the optimal pur-
chase decision vector is (g∗1 , · · · , g
∗
k), where g
∗
i = |Ei|, i =
1, 2, · · · , k gives the optimal number of goods to purchase at
the price of pi for the set Bi\Bi−1. This completes the proof.
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